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LEGAL ASPECTS OF ARSON
William C. Braun
The author is Chief Special Agent of the National Board of Fire Underwriters.
He presented the following article at the Eighth Annual Seminar in Arson Detection
and Investigation, Public Safety Institute, Purdue University, West Lafayette,
Indiana. April 28-May 2, 1952.-EDIToR.
Arson is a peculiar crime. It is committed covertly and in secrecy,
and consequently, the admissibility and sufficiency of evidence are prob-
lems to be solved. A conviction, if possible, is generally the result of
an accumulation of numerous bits of circumstantial evidence. The
prosecuting attorney, of necessity, is impelled to offer evidence bordering
on the imaginary line which separates the admissible from the inad-
missible.
Now for a moment let us consider the old common law crime of
arson which consisted of the wilful and malicious burning of the house
or outhouse of another man. It could not be committed by burning
an unoccupied dwelling. While the house had to be occupied, it was
not necessary that the occupant be in the building at the time of the
fire. The crime also included setting fire to any outhouses which
were used in connection with the dwelling and which were located close
enough so that the flames would endanger the occupants of the dwell-
ing. The crime was against the security of the home and not against
property and, therefore, the occupant could not commit the crime by
burning the house in which he lived. It is easy to see that arson at
common law was confined to very narrow limits. Other burnings were
punishable, not as arson, but as high misdemeanors.
To remedy the inadequacies of the common law, the legislatures of
the various states gradually began to extend and broaden the definition
of the crime, until today it covers all kinds of buildings and structures,
even including personal property. Now the crime of arson includes the
burning of the one's own property, whereas, at common law, it was
limited to the burning of the dwelling house occupied by another person.
While the legislative enactments in some states were adequate, in
others they fell short. The Model Arson Law was designed not only to
bring about uniformity but to correct the deficiencies of the common
law and the statutory laws. As will be seen later, the Model Law
covers practically any intentional burning that can occur and makes
it much easier than before to convict the arsonist. At the present time,
all states are operating under this law, with the exception of Maine,
Minnesota, New York, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas and Washington.
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The first section of the Model Arson Law covers the intentional
burning of any dwelling house or outhouse regardless of whether it is
occupied, unoccupied or vacant. It is immaterial whether it is his own
property or the property of another person.
The second section of the Model Arson Law covers the intentional
burning of any building or structure, of any class or character, except
those covered by the first section. Here again it is immaterial whether
it is his own property or the property of another.
The third section covers the intentional burning of personal property,
of any class or character, provided the value of the property is twenty-
five dollars or more and is the property of another person. You will
note that this section is limited to the burning of personal property of
another person. For instance, if I wished to burn some old clothing
or furniture, I could do so without committing arson, provided I did
not do it with the intention of defrauding an insurance company.
However, if I burned the clothing or furniture of some other person
of the value of twenty-five dollars or more, I would be committing
arson.
The fourth section covers an attempt to burn any of the buildings,
structures or personal property referred to in the preceding sections.
It also defines what shall constitute attempted arson by declaring that
the placing or distributing of any flammable explosive or combustible
material or substance or any device in any building or property that I
have mentioned, in an arrangement or preparation with the intent
to wilfully and maliciously burn same, or to procure the burning, shall
constitute an attempt. At common law, and under the statutes of the
various states, it was no crime to prepare a building for a fire. An
overt act, such as striking a match, was necessary. Under the Model
Arson Law, however, no overt act is necessary, mere preparation is
sufficient. This makes it possible to prosecute in many instances where
formerly a prosecution was impossible. For instance, suppose A, B,
and C, enter the basement of a store building during the night, bringing
with them several cans containing gasoline and varnish. After mixing
them, they spray the mixture on the ceiling and walls of the basement
and place a candle, but before they can light it police officers rush in
and arrest them. They can be convicted, under the Model Arson Law,
of attempted arson.
The final section covers the intentional burning of any property
mentioned in the other sections, which is insured against loss or
damage by fire, and with the intent to injure or defraud the insurer.
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The crime committed under this section is not termed arson but is a
felony. In a prosecution under this section it is not only necessary to
prove that the fire was intentionally set, but also that the specific
intent to injure or defraud the insurer was present.
Under the Model Arson Law, any person who aids, counsels or
procures is equally guilty with the person who actually starts the fire.
Principals and accessories are included, and therefore, we need not
concern ourselves with the definition of principals or accessories or their
implication as such. Let us take this case for example: The owner of
a restaurant and confectionery store finds his business dropping off
and before long he is facing a financial crisis. He is unable to borrow
sufficient money to see him through. A member of an arson ring hears
about his plight and sells him on the idea of having a fire. Later,
another member of the ring collects five hundred dollars from the
owner as a down payment and to cover the cost of materials needed
to set the fire. Two days before the fire, two members of the ring
conceal the materials with which the fire is to be set in the basement
of the restaurant.
Members of the ring hold a meeting where plans as to how and when
the fire is to be set are discussed and decided upon. The owner is then
informed that the fire is to be set on a certain night and that he is to
be out of town on business when the fire occurs. Under the Model
Arson Law, they would all be guilty of arson even though it was im-
possible to prove who actually lit the match.
In the case of the Commonwealth v. Flagg Chief Justice Morton,
citing numerous authorities, said: "It is an indictable offense at common
law for one to consel and solicit another to commit a felony or other
aggravated offense, although the solicitation is of no effect, and the
crime counselled is not in fact committed." 1
In this case Flagg had endeavored to persuade an acquaintance to
burn a barn belonging to a third person, urging him to do so on two
or three occasions, promising him money for doing so and, in fact,
advancing a small sum on account. The person solicited, however,
apparently took no action looking to the burning of the barn, but the
conviction of Flagg was sustained.
The mere burning of a building does not constitute the body of the
crime. There is no presumption that a building that has burned has
been intentionally set on fire; on the contrary, the presumption is that
the fire was accidental or of providential origin. In order, therefore,
1. 135 Mass. 545. 549 (1883).
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to prove the body of the crime (corpus delicti) it is necessary to show
first, that the building in question burned; and second, that it burned
as the result of the intentional criminal act of some person.
To constitute a burning there must be some burning or charring,
that is, the fiber of the wood must be destroyed, its identity changed.
A mere smoking, scorching or discoloration of the wood is not sufficient.
It is not necessary that the building be seriously damaged. All that is
required is the actual ignition of the smallest part, although there is no
blaze. For instance, if a person deliberately causes a short circuit in
the wiring, and there is only a smouldering, but no flame, and there
is a charring of the wood, however slight, the offense will have been
consummated.
Criminal intent involves two mental elements, i.e. wilfulness and
malice. Wilful means intentional and implies that the act was done
purposely and intentionally.
While malice is a necessary ingredient of the crime, it need not be
specifically proved. It may be implied if the act was done intentionally.
Malice in its broad sense denotes hatred or ill will or a desire for
revenge, whereas malice, in a legal sense, has a much more narrow
meaning. As the court pointed out in one case, "If a man in his
right mind intentionally burns the property belonging to another, the
jury ought to infer malice from the act itself."
Motive and intent are in no sense the same. They mean two different
things. Motive is the moving cause which induces the commission of a
crime. Intent is the purpose or design with which the act is done, and
involves the will. Intent is an essential element of a crime; motive is not.
For example: A woman employed in a cleaning establishment sud-
denly quit her job and shortly thereafter a fire occurred in her former
place of employment causing heavy damage. She confessed that she
had stolen some money from her employer and that she set the fire
to cover up the theft. The motive was her desire to cover up the
theft which induced her to form the intent to set the fire.
In that case, it was absolutely necessary for the prosecution to
prove the intent but not the motive. While the law does not require
the State to prove a motive, it is always well for the State to be able
to prove one, otherwise the jury may not convict.
When building his case, the investigator often asks himself what the
arsonist's defense will be. Therefore, it would be well to consider
some of the defenses which the accused might plead. The defense most
frequently used is "the alibi." This is where the defendant offers
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evidence that he was in another place at the time of the fire and, there-
fore, could not have committed the crime. This is termed "setting
up an alibi."
In some states, the law is that when the accused offers evidence of an
alibi, the burden of proof is on him to show, in support of his alibi,
facts and circumstances sufficient, when considered with all the other
evidence in the case, to create in the minds of the jury a reasonable
doubt of the truth of the charge against him.
In other states, evidence offered by the defendant tending to show he
was elsewhere at the time of the fire, does not change the burden of
proof and the prosecution must show the guilt of the defendant beyond
a reasonable doubt, the alibi evidence to be considered with all the
other evidence in the case. This is the prevailing rule and is in accord-
ance with one of the fundamental principles of American criminal juris-
prudence, that is, that the burden of proof rests with the prosecution
to prove the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt.
In a Michigan case, the defendant was convicted of burning an
unoccupied dwelling house, a barn and a frame building, for the pur-
pose of defrauding the insurer. She stated on the evening of the fire
that she went to a certain town to visit some friends but found no one
at home. She offered no evidence in support of her alibi. The State
introduced evidence showing that she boarded an electric train; that
she asked the conductor if the train stopped at a certain place, which
was the nearest stop to where the fire occurred, and that she got off the
train at that place about a half hour before the fire was discovered.
In affirming her conviction, the Michigan State Supreme Court said,
"In the absence of any affirmative testimony on the part of the defense
to explain the whereabouts of the defendant at the time of the fire, the
record fully sustains the verdict. Her connection with the crime was
not established by direct testimony as to her participation, but by the
converging forces of numerous circumstances which point quite clearly
to her guilt."
'2
A person cannot be convicted of a crime until it has been shown that
he is criminally responsible, that is, he must have sufficient mental capac-
ity to form the necessary criminal intent. One may have a weak or
impaired mind without being insane in the legal sense. Legal insanity
simply means that the person accused of the crime must have insufficient
mental capacity to distinguish between right and wrong. The law does
not permit the conviction of the insane, and if evidence is produced
indicating mental unsoundness at the time of the fire that issue must be
2. People v. Stewart, 163 Mich. 1, 127 N.W. 816.
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presented to the jury. The test was stated in McNaughten's Case as
follows: "There is no criminal responsibility where, at the time of the
committing of the act, the accused was laboring under such a defect of
reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality
of the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know
what he was doing was wrong." This is the prevailing rule.
The law presumes the defendant to be sane, but if he offers evidence
of his insanity, the burden rests upon the State to satisfy the jury
beyond a reasonable doubt that he was sane at the time he committed
the crime.
Pyromania may be defined as an irresistible impulse to start fires.
While the pyromaniac is mentally ill he is not always insane in a legal
sense, and therefore, is not necessarily protected by the rule relating
to insanity as he may well be aware of the nature of the act he is com-
mitting and may know that it is wrong. He simply is laboring under
such a mental disability that he is unable to resist the impilse to set
fires. The general rule is that an irresistible impulse to commit a crime
is not a defense. Regardless of the strict interpretation of the law the
pyromaniac is usually held as a psychopathic case. He should, of course,
be confined so that he can do no further harm, but there is no more
reason for punishing him as a criminal than there is for imprisoning
those who suffer from other forms of mental illness. Many cases
respond to medical treatment and, therefore, it would seem the most
intelligent and humane manner of dealing with these persons would be
to confine them in institutions where they may receive proper medical
care and treatment.
Intoxication is a defense that is often used. The general rule is that
voluntary intoxication is no excuse or defense for the commission of
the crime of arson. A person can refrain from drunkenness, but if by
drinking he brings upon himself a madness which causes him to set a fire,
it is held to be voluntary and he will not be excused for his wrongful act.
While this is the general rule, it does not hold in all of the states. In
some states it is recognized that excessive drinking may render one irre-
sponsible if he was so intoxicated that he could not possibly have formed
the necessary criminal intent, and this question may be submitted to the
jury. Evidence of slight intoxication does not require the submission
of this question to the jury.
At common law, a child under the age of seven years is conclusively
presumed incapable of entertaining the necessary intent to commit a
crime. In many states, however, the common law age has been raised
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by statute. For instance, under Illinois law, a child from one to ten
years is conclusively considered incapable. In the case of a child from
ten to fourteen years, there is a rebuttable presumption that the child
is incapable, but this presumption may be overcome by clear and con-
vincing evidence that the child knew the difference between right and
wrong.
Occasionally the defense of entrapment may arise. According to the
prevailing rule, there is no entrapment if the crime originated in the
mind of the defendant and the public officials are informed that the
crime is to be committed and they keep themselves concealed and
permit the accused to start the fire before they arrest him.
An interesting case where the defendants set up the defense of insti-
gation and entrapment occurred in California. The facts briefly are:
A., the owner of a dwelling, needed money and decided to burn his
house so that he could collect the insurance. He talked about it to B.
who suggested that he procure C., who made a profession of setting
fires, to do the job. The owner thereafter discussed what had trans-
pired with a friend who advised him that he had better report the matter
to the authorities. The owner thereupon informed the local fire chief,
who, in turn, took the matter up with the police officials and together
they worked out a plan of action in which the owner was to play along
with the police officers. The owner arranged to have B. meet him in
the basement of a certain building where a dictaphone had been in-
stalled. While the owner and B. were discussing plans for the fire,
the officers listened in on the conversation. C. was employed to do the
burning for which A. agreed to pay him three hundred and fifty dollars.
On the night of the fire, C. and his assistant went to the owner's home
and the three of them prepared the place for burning by spreading
gasoline over the premises and applying a lighted candle to it. By pre-
arrangement, the officers had secreted themselves on the premises. They
extinguished the fire and arrested the three defendants. The defendant
B., who had advised the owner to employ C., was later arrested.
The defendants were convicted and appealed. In affirming their
conviction, the Supreme Court of the State of California stated, "It
conclusively appears that the crime was originally conceived by the
owner and B., independent of any aid or suggestion from the officers.
There is no question that when the scheme was thus formed the owner,
for purposes of his own, betrayed B. and that the defendants were
thereafter encouraged in the perpetration of their criminal design by
the officers. There is a distinction, however, between inducing a person
1952]
WILLIAM C. BRA UN
to do an unlawful act and the setting of a trap to catch him in the exe-
cution of a criminal plan of his own conception.' 3
In another case the subject of entrapment was fully reviewed by the
Supreme Court of California and the conclusion, in substance, is there
reached, "that if the criminal design originated with the perpetrators
of the act they cannot escape conviction merely by reason of the fact
that a trap was laid for them, or that they were facilitated in the exe-
cution of their enterprise by officers of the law who acted for the pur-
pose of detecting them in the perpetration of their unlawful act. The
great weight of authority is in accordance with this view." 4
From this it is understood that if the criminal plan is conceived in
the minds of the perpetrators it is not entrapment; but if the criminal
design was conceived in the minds of the police officers, and they in-
duced someone to commit the crime, then it would be entrapment.
Arson may be proved either by direct or circumstantial evidence or
both. The nature of the crime being what it is, the prosecution in
most instances must rely upon circumstantial evidence for a conviction.
Direct evidence proves the fact directly without any inference or pre-
sumption such as where a witness sees the defendant set the fire. Cir-
cumstantial evidence, on the other hand, takes a more round-about route
to prove the fact in issue by uncovering facts here and there; and all
these facts and circumstances, when considered together, must point to
only one conclusion-the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt.
The courts have held that a strong set of circumstances are just as con-
vincing as direct evidence, and in some cases even more so.
To build a case on circumstantial evidence requires many more wit-
nesses than does a case based on direct evidence, and therein lies the
great strength of circumstantial evidence. It is highly improbable that
a number of witnesses in a circumstantial case could be induced to
perjure themselves to unjustly convict a defendant, whereas, if a person
testified that he saw the crime committed, but in fact did not, there is a
possibility that his false testimony may never be'detected which might
result in the conviction of an innocent man. As the Court stated in one
case, "I have no hesitation in expressing the opinion that where there
has been one unjust conviction upon circumstantial evidence, there may
have been three innocent persons condemned upon the direct testimony
of perjured witnesses."
In the case of the Commonwealth v. Braunfeldt, the Court, when
instructing the jury said: 'It may be important here for me to direct
3. People v. Caiazza, et al. 61' Cal. App. 505, 215 Pacific 80.
4. People v. Rodriquez, 214 Pacific 452.
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your attention to the character of the evidence that is offered before
you. Evidence or proof in such cases may be either direct or positive
or circumstantial. Let me illustrate. If a man knowing, as we all
know by this time, that there is a clock on this building that strikes the
hour, goes to its tower and there stands as the next hour approaches,
and watches the hammer strike the bell, and then comes down and in a
case in which that fact may be material, testifies that he saw the ham-
mer strike, and as it is known to all men that bells vibrate and sound
when they are thus struck, that he heard the bell ring, that at least, for
the purpose of illustration in this case, may be cited as an illustration or
example of direct or positive testimony. But, if you as Jurors, or others
in this courtroom during these days -you have sat here, and as the hour
was reached heard that same bell strike, and should afterwards testify
that, let me say, at one o'clock this afternoon the courthouse clock struck
the hour of one, that would be circumstantial testimony. You have
been here and heard the clock strike, hour by hour, you feel the building
vibrate when the hammer strikes; you hear the sound coming from that
direction at the appointed time, and you conclude that that bell struck.
I hope that I have illustrated the difference between positive and cir-
cumstantial evidence."
In another case, the United States Supreme Court, speaking through
one of its greatest Chief Justices, stated: "No witness has been pro-
duced who saw the act committed, and hence it is urged for the pris-
oner that the evidence is only circumstantial, and consequently entitled
to a very inferior degree of credit, if to any credit at all; but that conse-
quence does not necessarily follow."
"Indeed, I scarcely know whether there is such a thing as evidence
purely positive. You see a man discharge a gun at another, you see the
flash, you hear the report, you see the person fall a lifeless corpse, and
you infer from all these circumstances that there was a ball discharged
from the gun which entered his body and caused his death, because such
is the usual and natural cause of such an effect. But, you did not see
the ball leave the gun, pass through the air and enter, the body of the
slain; and your testimony to the fact of the killing is therefore infer-
ential; in other words, circumstantial. It is possible that no ball was
in the gun, and we infer that there was only because we cannot account
for that death on any other supposition."
It is the duty of the investigator to gather the evidence and present
it to the prosecuting attorney, whose duty it then becomes to institute
whatever criminal prosecution the facts may warrant. Every investi-
gator should familiarize himself with the laws of his state pertaining to
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arson and related crimes. He should be able to distinguish between
the various offenses and the ingredients of each so that he will know
which law has been violated and what evidence to look for.
In some states there is a Fire Marshal's law and, when operating
under that law, the investigator has more power and authority than any
other peace officer. In order to effectively discharge his duties he should
not only be familiar with the law itself, but also with any court de-
cisions that may have been rendered.
The success or failure of an arson investigation depends, not only on
how competent the arson investigator is, but also on the degree of co-
operation that exists between him and the police and fire services,
prosecuting attorneys and others with whom he is obliged to work.
Unfortunately, in many instances, this cooperation is lacking, possibly
due to envy, jealousy or other reasons; such a situation might result in
losing a case. The investigation of an arson case is not an easy one by
any means and the going it made more difficult when there is not the
necessary cooperation. It is only when the spirit of friendliness and
hearty cooperation prevails that we can make an honest, all-out effort
to curb arson.
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